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 1  Introduction 
  
This report is a study of ethical and societal 
issues connected with EADGENE. Its overall 
objective is to provide an overview of such 
issues. The report focuses on three important 
areas of interplay between the Network and the 
public at large. We label these (i) Public 
Relations versus public relations, (ii) openness 
versus confidentiality, and (iii) parties unable to 
voice their concerns: animal welfare. These 
areas present challenges that must be dealt with 
by the Network. 
 
It is the task of WP 12.1 to facilitate deliber-
ation on questions of values, social interests and 
moral disagreement, relevant to the Network 
issues. The efforts of the team from the Danish 
Centre for Bioethics and Risk Assessment, 
CeBRA, have been aimed at providing a quali-
fied input for ethical reflection within the 
Network, relating to questions of values and 
social interests. Such deliberation should be 
seen as a precondition for entering into a public 
dialogue about the efforts of the Network. A 
summary of the report was presented to 
Network members for discussion at the 
EADGENE  in Brussels in May 2005. 
 
Official EADGENE documents, including the 
so-called Technical Annex, website and the 
newsletter, are the primary sources for the 
report. It must be noted though that the 
Technical Annex is the outcome of a negoti-
ation with the EC and therefore contains 
various compromises. However, the report also 
draws on the opening meeting of EADGENE in 
Paris in October 2004; and it is influenced by a 
series of interviews with scientists undertaken 
by the CeBRA team. We say ‘influenced by’, 
because these interviews were still in progress 
when this report was written and in fact form 
the basis of a separate report (Principles for 
ethical deliberation in bio-scientific projects). 
No direct reference will be made to the 
interviews in the present report. 
 
 
Ethics and genomics 
 
EADGENE is a, so-called, Network of Excel-
lence. It aims primarily to develop and integrate 
knowledge of mechanisms at the molecular -
level that affect the host-pathogen interactions 
in farm animals; and to find ways to modulate 
those mechanisms so as to combat various 
infectious diseases in farm animals. Thus, the 
focus of EADGENE research is, and must be, 
on genuinely fundamental and applied scientific 
problems — problems that can be approached 
through scientific methods and admit of 
technical solutions. At the same time, however, 
EADGENE research takes place in a broader, 
social context that does not in the same way 
render itself open to scientific investigation and 
technical solutions. In this broader context, 
ethical reflection and discussion are needed: 
reflection and discussion that inquire into basic 
assumptions, beliefs, attitudes and moral 
values. 
 
Controversies over modern biological science 
and biotechnology can be traced back to differ-
ences in such assumptions and values. More 
often than not, discussions that appear, at first 
glance, to be rather straightforward debates 
about risks and benefits prove to be less 
straightforward on closer inspection. They dis-
close a more basic disagreement about values, 
about what is good, and what is bad, and what 
is important and why it is important: what do 
we mean by ‘better’ and ‘healthier’ animals? 
What means, and what ends, are right, or at 
least acceptable? Is it, for instance, acceptable 
to use challenge tests — to infect animals in 
order to study them — to understand the gene-
tic mechanisms behind specific infectious ani-
1
 mal diseases and, possibly, to identify ways of 
combating those diseases? Different answers to 
these questions may reflect differing values. 
To contribute in a reasonable way to dis-
cussions on controversial questions like this, 
one must be as clear as possible about one’s 
own values. It is a demanding task: in 
everyday-life people do not go about reflecting 
on their assumptions and values. As a rule, 
assumptions and values form the basis of 
action, and are not subjected to scrutiny. One 
must also be willing both to acknowledge the 
existence of other values and to enter into a 
dialogue that might result in the value-
adjustment. That is what ethical reflection is 
about. 
 
Ethical reflection aims to cope with aspects of 
human life that scientific endeavours seek to 
keep at a distance in order to get the scientific 
facts right. While science aims to get the 
scientific facts right, ethical reflection on 
science takes into account the context in which 
people question the purpose of producing those 
particular facts in the first place. While the 
development of technology aims to find work-
able solutions, ethical reflection on technology 
takes into account the context in which those 
solutions may or may not be deemed accep-
table. Thus, ethical reflection on science and 
technology is crucial to decisions on how to 
integrate the work of scientists into the practical 
life of society. 
In connection with the use of genomics in 
animal breeding and livestock production, 
different technological options no doubt will 
present themselves as science moves on. 
Choices will have to be made. They may 
inspire controversy; they are certain to involve 
value-based judgements. Dilemmas will have to 
be faced. When — besides our concern for fel-
low human beings — we have to take animals 
(or even ‘nature’) into account, the dilemmas 
are bound to increase, and it will be impossible 
to identify exact and clear, scientific answers to 
the questions of how to make right choices. 
There are many legitimate concerns to 
attend to, and some of these are likely to be at 
odds with each other. The consideration of 
ethical and societal aspects of scientific and 
technological enterprises is all about coping 
with ambiguity, mastering one’s own ambi-
valence, understanding the ambivalence of 
others, listening and, at the end of the day, 
seeking out and arguing for a certain balance 
that involves priorities: to acknowledge the 
existence of disagreement and ambivalence is 
not to preclude the possibility of discussing 
disagreement in an open and civilized way, 
provided that all parties involved are willing to 
take the trouble of reflecting upon their own 
values and ideas as well as on those of others. It 
is time-consuming. Given that science is a part 
of society, it is also inescapable. 
 
 
Doing the ‘right’ thing and  
doing it the ‘right’ way 
 
In the pages that follow, ethical questions of 
two distinct, although interrelated, categories 
will be presented. One category concerns the 
content of scientific research; the other con-
cerns the way research and deliberation is 
conducted. Thus, the first category relates 
mainly to the product and is concerned with 
doing the right thing, whereas the second cate-
gory mainly relates to the process, and is con-
cerned with doing things in the right way. 
There is no universal agreement on what is 
the right thing — although widespread support 
for the ideal of pluralism can be seen as an 
expression of agreement that there should 
indeed be room for moral disagreement. 
Consequently, nobody can be expected to prove 
that they are actually doing the right thing. That 
someone is doing the right thing is beyond 
proof, but it is certainly not beyond argumen-
tation. Thus, members of the Network are not 
faced with the task of proving that the research 
questions posed, and the technological paths 
pursued within the framework of EADGENE, 
are the only valid questions and solutions. They 
must, however, try to explain on what grounds 
specific questions and solutions have been 
chosen. Moreover, they face the challenge of 
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 acknowledging that differing views may exist 
and cannot simply be ignored. 
Consequently, even though there is no 
universally accepted right thing there is a 
demand to do things properly in order to make 
room, at the same time, for disagreement and 
co-existence. On this condition, dialogue and 
discussion become keywords, and the task of 
the Network in relation to ethical challenges 
can be summed up in a very simple chain of 
‘wh-questions’: that is, questions that members 
of the Network must consider: 
• what they are trying to achieve  
• why they are trying to achieve it  
• what basic assumptions and values they ad-
here to  
• whether there is disagreement on this within 
the Network as well as between the Net-
work and other groups in society 
• what kind of potentially conflicting con-
cerns and values can be identified 
• in what way such conflicting concerns may 
be balanced 
 
 
Three significant ethical issues 
 
Three ethical issues — relating to the ‘product’ 
as well as to the ‘process’ — will be high-
lighted in the present report. As mentioned 
above, the three challenges will be presented 
under the headlines of: 
 
1. Public Relations versus public relations 
2. Openness vs confidentiality 
3. Parties unable to voice their concerns: 
animal welfare 
 
The first issue is associated with how scientists 
relate to, and should relate to, the public at 
large, considering that scientists are not above 
self-interest. Key themes are: PR versus public 
relations; overselling versus sincerity; the aim 
of being attractive versus the aim of contri-
buting to dialogue. 
The second issue is associated with the 
commercialization of science and scientific 
research. Thus, the spotlight is on the relation-
ship between science and vested interests. Key 
themes are: traditional scientific and academic 
values; openness versus confidentiality; diffe-
rent ideas about knowledge as a common good. 
The third issue is associated with a group 
which has not been addressed by the first two 
issues, i.e. animals. It is concerned with animal 
welfare. Key themes are: use of animals and 
care for animals; different ideas about animal 
health; differences between genetic modifica-
tion and the use of genomics in animal breeding 
and livestock production; purposes of research. 
 
The three issues are interrelated. Each relates to 
fundamental questions about purpose, and 
about the consequences and limits of scientific 
knowledge and its possible technological appli-
cations. This means that themes underlying one 
issue may be relevant to the other issues as 
well. It also means that although the presen-
tation is as systematic as possible, neat 
separation of the issues is not achievable. The 
presentations complement each other and 
should be read in succession. That is so because 
the challenges form part of an overall chal-
lenge: that is, the challenge of developing a 
professional ethics for science within the 
framework of society, and, paradoxically, on 
the basis of traditional scientific values that 
have been shaped by assumptions about science 
being, in many respects, outside society.  
At present, as scientific research becomes 
ever more important to society, many other 
groups of scientists and fields of science face a 
similar challenge. It is not EADGENE specific. 
But it is highly EADGENE relevant. The 
presentation of the issues will, for this reason, 
look at general as well as specific aspects, first 
pointing to the EADGENE-specific issues, then 
to the underlying themes, and finally sum-
marizing questions for further deliberation. 
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 2  Public Relations versus public relations 
  
EADGENE specific 
 
EADGENE is faced by a temptation to oversell 
the potential outcomes of its research in order 
to attract investment and future funding. Conse-
quently, the Network is also confronted by the 
challenge not to oversell, and to try to be realis-
tic and sincere. This is an issue that is hardly 
confronted at all in the EADGENE documents. 
Indeed, no distinction seems to be made 
between Public Relations and ethical reflection. 
To illustrate: it is stated that attempts should 
be made at “teaching the scientists and 
stakeholders to speak to consumers and society 
in an understandable, transparent and attractive 
way”.1 Here there is a mixture of the two dif-
ferent purposes of ‘transparency’ and ‘attrac-
tiveness’. In practice, they may go well together 
— or they may not; but is unclear from the 
documents how these purposes are supposed to 
be balanced. Moreover, problems relating to 
scientific uncertainty and complexity — trans-
parency about which may be contrary to the 
aim of appearing attractive — go unmentioned. 
Along the same lines, there is ambivalence 
in the sections of the documents describing 
relations with the public. On the one hand, the 
documents point to a need for a dialogue with 
the public, and they argue in terms of a public 
right to know what is going on. On the other 
hand, the documents are rich in statements 
about the aims of persuading the public, of 
making people confident and “comfortable 
with”  the kind of research pursued by the Net-
work. Moreover, it is argued that, in this way, 
science and industry will be able to achieve 
“greater identification with livestock produc-
tion”, improved sales and, thereby, “a greater 
sustainability and competitiveness of European 
livestock production industries”.  But to enter 
into a dialogue and to achieve identification is 
not the same thing. Again, although in practice 
                                                 
1 Annex I to Network contract: Description of Work, p.11 
these purposes may fit well together, they may 
also be in conflict. Dialogue may disclose 
substantial disagreement. 
In today’s culture of PR and pressure on 
scientists to show themselves to be useful to the 
point of being indispensable, the purposes of 
attractiveness and of persuasion into identifi-
cation are likely to become dominant. Trans-
parency and dialogue are likely to become 
marginalized, unless efforts are made to prevent 
this. 
 
One way of stimulating reflection, among 
members of the Network, on how to adhere to a 
principle of sincerity and a purpose of dialogue 
with the public at large may be to re-enter, for 
internal purposes, discussion on the aims of the 
EADGENE network itself. The project docu-
ments contain a long list of reasons and pur-
poses. Are all of these of equal importance? Are 
they compatible? 
The overall goal of the Network appears to 
be to try to understand the host pathogen 
interaction at the molecular level using a geno-
mic approach. This knowledge may be applied: 
to combat food-transmitted zoonoses and to 
render superfluous much of the present anti-
biotic treatment of animals to reduce residues of 
antibiotics in food for human consumption. 
Thus, there is a focus on human health and on 
more efficient processes of production. How-
ever, a host of other purposes are mentioned as 
well: 
 
• Strengthening the competitiveness and sus-
tainability of European agriculture and 
aquaculture by applying genomics 
• Creating a new market for breeding, hus-
bandry, diagnostics and animal health 
industries 
• Improving the public image of European 
agriculture, thereby increasing the con-
sumption of European agricultural products 
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 • Securing continued European influence on 
animal breeding on a global scale 
• Furthering communication and cooperation 
between ‘science’, on the one hand, and 
‘technology and society’, on the other 
• Promoting the use of genomic tools 
• Becoming the best in the world in the Net-
work’s field of research 
• Producing healthier and more robust farm 
animals 
 
Furthermore, hope is expressed that the know-
ledge generated could be used so: 
 
• Improved treatment of human beings may 
be facilitated by way of research findings 
regarding host-pathogen relationships in 
animals  
• The research will improve readiness to fight 
new, infectious diseases that may evolve 
 
The documents mention a wide spectrum of 
efforts that may result from the knowledge to 
achieve the goals, comprising: 
 
• Development of vaccines  
• Improved prognostics 
• Improved diagnostics 
• Improved surveillance  
• Improved treatment, including medical 
treatment 
• Improved breeding techniques that may be 
used to increase the immune defence and/or 
to improve responses to vaccination 
• Improved conditions for the animals (this 
refers to the aim of disease prevention by 
means of strengthening the immune de-
fence) 
 
Furthermore, there is an internal goal for the 
research field — which may be very important 
to some Network members and of little im-
portance to others — of securing future funding 
for research. Thus, it is foreseen in the docu-
ments that members may “negotiate an in-
creasing financial participation of industrials”2 
to continue the research effort after the 
expiration of the Network. It is the wish of EU 
to have a sort of European Centre of Excellence 
on this subject, also after 4/5 years helping to 
set priorities at the EU level and to prevent 
fragmentation in research and research policies. 
The same abundance of aims and means is 
presented both on the website and in the news-
letter, and in a press release the Network has 
been described as aiming at the improvement of 
“animal health”. Thus, the Network appears to 
have: economic and commercial aims; internal 
scientific aims (relating to the specific research 
field of the Network and to the field of geno-
mics, and indeed science, in general); aims of 
improving animal health; and aims of im-
proving human health. It is nowhere discussed, 
however, whether and to what extent these aims 
are compatible with each other. 
Before the public sphere is entered, the 
compatibility and the priority of these various 
purposes should be reflected upon: it should be 
asked to what extent, for instance, is the aim of 
improving animal health compatible with the 
aim of strengthening the competitiveness of 
European agriculture? 
 
Again, on entering the public sphere, it is very 
important to reflect on the role that is ascribed 
to the public. The EADGENE documents refer 
to the purpose of dialogue with the public. The 
term ‘dialogue’ involves the assumption that 
the public are potential partners and on equal 
terms with the researchers. There is, however, 
ambiguity here as well. In other sections of the 
documents, industry seems to be perceived as 
an active partner (supposed to play a major role 
in the use of the knowledge generated and the 
implementation into practice), while the public 
at large — referred to randomly as ‘society’, 
‘citizens’ and ‘consumers’ — appears to be 
seen as a collection of passive recipients of the 
products of scientific research. This latter idea 
of the public seems, for instance, to underlie the 
intention of making a “Communication Plan to 
                                                 
2 Annex I to Network contract: Description of Work, p 15 
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 reinforce citizens’ public awareness and easy 
understanding of science”.3 But this is an idea 
of the public that fits rather badly with the aim 
of dialogue. Rather it is about providing infor-
mation. 
Key questions are: is the purpose dialogue, 
or is it merely the provision of information? Is 
the public perceived to consist of consumers 
(having certain rights, but no responsibilities) 
or of citizens (having both rights and respon-
sibilities)? The latter question is crucial, be-
cause interaction with citizens is different from, 
and much more demanding than, interaction 
with consumers. A dialogue with citizens is a 
dialogue resting on an assumption of shared 
responsibilities. It is closely related to ideas 
about civil society and public discussion as 
important societal elements. One does not have 
to subscribe to these ideas, but the terms of 
dialogue indicate a commitment to them. Such 
commitment is not easily reconciled with the 
notion that the public are consumers and 
passive recipients of information. 
 
In conclusion: a principle of sincerity vis-à-
vis the public and society at large should be 
formulated. It is, however, insufficient simp-
ly to adopt such a principle. Sincerity pre-
supposes that one is aware of what to be 
sincere about. A careful reading of the pro-
ject documents indicates that, in order to 
adhere to such a principle, some basic re-
flection on purposes (of communication) and 
on assumptions (about the public) needs to 
be undertaken. 
 
 
Underlying themes: dialogue and 
sincerity 
 
There is pressure on scientists to deliver 
solutions to problems and to develop new 
technologies that will boost economic growth 
on a national or a European scale, providing 
society with wealth and with hope. At the same 
time, there is intense competition for research 
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funding. A growing number of researchers are 
competing for public and private funding, and 
as a rule scientific research is becoming ever 
more costly. Scientists may therefore feel com-
pelled to give lofty descriptions of the expected 
outcomes of their research projects. Such 
overselling may be looked on as no more than 
an illustration of traditional scientific optimism. 
But it can also be seen as representing a breach 
of sincerity — as a departure from a norm that 
is central to (at least) western culture. It is a 
powerful norm. Thus, probably almost all 
readers of this report will find it quite 
superfluous for us to argue that insincerity is 
wrong. 
 
Boasting with a view to gain has been looked 
down on for thousands of years of western 
history. More than 2000 years ago the Greek 
philosopher Aristotle warned against boasting 
— in particular, boasting motivated by self-
interest, with a view to gain4. In the sixteenth 
century, the influential French essayist, Michel 
de Montaigne, argued that insincerity is one of 
the very worst vices. He observed that speech is 
what binds humankind together, and argued 
that falsity in speaking destroys human com-
munity.5 
In more recent times, in the 1970s, Hannah 
Arendt, a German-American thinker, has ar-
gued that there “always comes the point beyond 
which lying becomes counterproductive. This 
point is reached when the audience to which the 
lies are addressed is forced to disregard al-
together the distinguishing line between truth 
and falsehood in order to be able to survive”. 
From her discussion of lying, Arendt made a 
smooth transition to the phenomenon of PR. 
She suggested that PR was linked to an assump-
tion that  “half of politics is ‘image-making’ 
and the other half the art of making people 
believe in the imagery”,6 and she argued that 
                                                 
4 Aristotle; book II, vii, pp 45, 105 and 107 
5 Montaigne in”Wenn man einander des Lügens 
bezichtigt”; p. 508, vol. II 
6 Arendt; p 7-8 
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 this perception of politics is detrimental to 
public and political life. 
Recently, an international group of resear-
chers from the field of ‘science studies’ has 
focused directly on boasting in science. They 
have stated: “Today insubstantial promises, 
which are based upon a potential that is difficult 
to assess properly and which will take time to 
develop fully but which are amplified through 
the media, excite the imagination of industry 
and the public and influence decisions about 
which parts of basic research are to be funded 
and which lines of inquiry are to be pursued”. 
The group refers to “a thin line between 
authentic belief in the future potential and mere 
rhetoric of ‘selling’ a particular line of research 
to politicians and the public”, and they argue 
that, increasingly, researchers adopt ‘sales tech-
niques’ when trying to obtain funding for what 
are in reality no more than ‘options’ or potential 
spin-offs of unknowable research results.7 
 
What is the point of the above quotations? The 
point is not to make the case that insincerity 
and boasting is wrong (since most people 
would readily agree to a principle of sincerity), 
but rather to show how deeply ingrained in 
European culture this code of conduct is. Even 
though we live today in a pervasive culture of 
PR — which, incidentally, has been turned into 
a quasi-scientific discipline in its own right — 
the moral requirement of sincerity persists in 
the minds of citizens. Insincerity is particularly 
disliked in scientists, because science is expec-
ted to comply with the highest standards and to 
be above self-interest. Belief in scientific claims 
and trust in scientists are very much based on 
that assumption. 
Consequently, the widespread habit of 
adopting commercial sales techniques may be 
seen as a threat to science, a practice that is 
likely to undermine trust in scientists. Sales 
techniques are linked to a good deal of 
cynicism, not the least at the receiving end. 
Where ideals are seen to be invoked as mere 
rhetorical devices and as means to further 
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vested interests, they are likely to inspire 
suspicion. At the receiving end they are likely 
to inspire the suspicious question ‘what does he 
try to sell?’ rather than the interested question 
‘what has he got to say?’ 
 
In conclusion, there is a schism in European 
societies of today between the principle of 
sincerity and a practice of boasting. First and 
foremost, this schism is a challenge to science 
and scientists. Unconfronted, it may, in the 
longer term, undermine trust in science and 
scientists, and it may erode belief in the very 
ideas of knowledge and truth that form the 
foundation of science. 
 
 
For further deliberation in the Network 
 
In concrete terms there is a question for the 
Network of how to draw a line between having 
and presenting a vision, on the one hand, and 
embarking upon overselling, on the other.  
 
To answer this question, the purposes of the 
Network have to be considered. We need to 
ask: 
 
• What is the main purpose of the Network?  
• To what extent are the declared purposes 
compatible with one another?  
• Is EADGENE a private, commercial net-
work, suited to the adoption of PR exercises 
modelled on the sales techniques of com-
mercial companies; or is it, rather, a public 
network, faced with the task of finding 
alternative ways of relating to the public?  
• What is the purpose of communicating with 
the public, and of the website and the news-
letter? 
• What kind of public is envisaged?  
• And finally, how should aspects of scien-
tific uncertainty be taken into the public 
sphere? 
7
 3  Openness vs confidentiality 
 
EADGENE specific 
 
The value of openness — ‘transparency’ — is 
important to the EADGENE network, judging 
from the project documents. Thus, there are fre-
quent references to a principle of transparency. 
However, these references are somewhat blur-
red by the reservation that there should be as 
much transparency “as possible”.8 Paragraphs 
starting with a reference to openness may end 
up with a reference to a need for confidentiality. 
For instance, it is stated that the “global 
strategy will be focused on the need to use and 
disseminate the knowledge, but also to protect 
it where industrial or commercial exploitation is 
possible, in accordance with IPRs to be 
granted”.9   
There seems to be a commitment to open-
ness and concealment at the same time. There 
may be good reasons for taking such a stance. 
Those who deliberate on the value of openness, 
informed by the present conditions under which 
research is undertaken, cannot simply ignore 
that confidentiality is crucial to some stake-
holders. Deliberation is likely to lead to the 
formulation of principles guiding the balancing 
of conflicting concerns. Such deliberation is, 
however, not made explicit in the documents. 
Rather, the documents seem to by-pass the fact 
that concerns about openness and concerns 
about confidentiality are indeed conflicting 
concerns. 
It may be argued that there are no conflicts 
at all, because the system of intellectual proper-
ty rights should be seen as a guarantee of open-
ness. To what extent, and under what condi-
tions, that is actually the case has, however, to a 
growing extent become a controversial issue. 
Consequently, there is a need for the conflicting 
concerns to be confronted and spelled out.  
 
                                                 
8 Annex I to Network contract: Description of Work, p 59 
9 Annex I to Network contract: Description of Work, p 45 
Ambivalence regarding a concern for openness 
and a concern for confidentiality — and, more 
broadly, regarding conflicts of interest — ap-
pears also in relation to the Network’s Club of 
Interest. This group, it is stated, is supposed to 
provide advice on “the industrial and citizen 
needs”.10 Elaboration on the relationship and 
potential conflicts between the needs of in-
dustry and the needs of citizens — not to 
mention different groups of citizens — is 
absent. While this may, in the short term, create 
a feeling of consensus, it leaves the Network 
unprepared, in the longer term, to cope with 
such conflicts if, or when, they actually 
materialize: in the end, the pretence of con-
sensus may bring about much deeper and more 
bitter conflicts than would have emerged if it 
had been acknowledged from the outset that 
there is a potential for conflict to be dealt with. 
Conflicts of interest and disagreement about 
values form part of the reality of societal life. 
Ignoring conflicts is not the same as dissolving 
them. On the contrary, it is likely to inspire 
suspicion, and to pave the way for explosive 
and unsolvable conflicts. To confront them, 
instead, in an attempt to find ethically 
acceptable ways of dealing with them, may 
inspire mutual respect and dialogue — within 
the Network and in relations between the 
Network and the public at large. 
 
 
Underlying themes: knowledge as a 
common good 
 
The present drive towards confidentiality and 
private ownership of scientific knowledge re-
presents a breach of specific academic and 
scientific values; that is, values of openness and 
disinterestedness, and of knowledge as a com-
mon good. These values have been of enormous 
importance in the history of science, and they 
                                                 
10 Annex I to Network contract: Description of Work, p 9 
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 have been crucial to science gaining a very high 
status in today’s societies: science has been, 
and is expected to be, above, not only self-
interest and the promotion of self-interest, but 
also vested interests in general. 
 
In the 1940s the American sociologist Robert 
K. Merton described the ethos of modern scien-
ce as universalism, disinterestedness, organized 
scepticism, and communism. (By the latter he 
meant that scientific knowledge was to be 
regarded as common property. Contrast the 
definition of technology as private property.)11  
Clashes between the ideals of openness and 
knowledge as a common good, on the one hand, 
and private property rights, on the other hand, 
are not a new phenomenon. Probably, this 
schism has been part of the development of 
modern science all along. So have close — al-
though never uncomplicated — relations with 
the marketplace.12 That is part of the back-
ground to the statement, made by European 
university rectors when they met in 1988 in 
Bologna to word and sign The Magna Charta of 
University, that: “To meet the needs of the 
world around it, its [the university’s] research 
and teaching must be morally and intellectually 
independent of all political authority and 
economic power”.13 
In short: ambivalence about the ideals of 
openness, disinterestedness and of knowledge 
as a common good appears to be a basic feature 
of science — a challenge that scientists must 
live with and try to come to terms with over and 
over again. At present, however, there seems to 
be a tendency within the scientific community 
to ignore the challenge. 
More than a decade of heated debate in the 
EU about whether or not to allow patents on 
genes, plants and animals bears witness to the 
fact that the ideals are still very much alive, not 
only in the scientific community — as un-
doubtedly they are — but also more widely in 
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12 See for instance Butterfield; p 185 
13 The Magna Charta of University may be found at 
www.unige.ch/cre  
society. The scientific community has, how-
ever, not been very outspoken, and has certainly 
not taken the lead, in such public discussions; 
and some findings suggest that the political and 
ethical aspects of opening these new fields to 
patenting have not been much discussed among 
scientists themselves, not even among scientists 
working in areas of direct relevance to the 
discussion.14 
One almost gets the impression that the 
ambivalence has dissolved: that is, that it is in 
practice no longer necessary to take the 
traditional, scientific ethos into account. Euro-
pean policies and legislation, on a national level 
and at EU-level, give a similar impression. 
Following the model of American legislation, 
scientists who are employed by universities and 
other public research institutions are obliged to 
apply for patents whenever possible, and 
universities are enabled to own patents. More-
over, researchers are urged to enter into close 
cooperation with commercial companies, but 
there are no incentives whatsoever to encourage 
scientists to deliberate about how to reconcile 
new working conditions with traditional values. 
Again, scientists are trapped by a conflict of 
conscience; a conflict which — if it remains 
unconfronted — might in the longer term result 
in deteriorating relations with the public at 
large. This is likely to occur in so far as citizens 
still expect science and scientists simply to ad-
here to the traditional values in a straight-
forward manner. In the UK the Royal Society 
has been concerned about this. In 2002 it asked 
Market and Opinion Research International, a 
market research company, to do a survey of 
science-related issues that caused concern to the 
public. More than half, 55 percent, of the 1001 
interviewees (interviewed by telephone) agreed 
to the statement that the funding of scientific 
research is becoming too commercialized.  27 
percent disagreed. As to the relative importance 
of issues causing concern, biological weapons 
was on top of the list (74 percent of the 
respondents); global warming came next (70 
percent of respondents), followed by genetic 
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 modification of food and animals (60 percent of 
respondents).15 
 
In today’s policies the values of openness and 
disinterestedness appear to be seen as obstacles 
to another old scientific ideal — that of science 
as a means to further economic growth, thus 
securing the foundations for material welfare: 
knowledge as a common good in another sense. 
These different ideas about knowledge as a 
common good — common in the sense of 
openness, and in the sense of securing material 
welfare for everybody — have actually co-
existed; but today’s mainstream argumentation 
runs: ‘You cannot have your cake and eat it. 
Either you have openness, or you have eco-
nomic growth. Either you insist on openness or 
you get your research funded’. Facing this 
dilemma, scientists seem to opt for economic 
growth, confidentiality and funding, arguing 
that the purpose of keeping scientific research 
going must overrule all other considerations — 
because scientific knowledge is a common 
good.  
As already highlighted by Merton, there is 
“a tendency for scientists to assume that the 
social effects of science must be beneficial in 
the long run. This article of faith performs the 
function of providing a rationale for scientific 
research”.16 
The article of faith alluded to by Merton has 
always carried a question: is science beneficial 
in the long run, just like that, regardless of any 
other consideration and conditions? Is the 
common interest in the production of more 
scientific knowledge so strong as to render 
conflicts of social interest irrelevant and to 
permit such conflicts to be ignored? In what 
sense should knowledge be seen, and dealt 
with, as a public good? 
 
The millennia-old idea about the common good 
has always been a controversial one, open to 
different and, indeed, conflicting interpre-
tations. Nevertheless, it cannot be taken to 
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16 Merton; p 600 
mean just about anything. There are limits to 
interpretations. The very existence of a notion 
of ‘the common good’ implies that a distinction 
should be made, a distinction — in some way 
or another — between the common good and 
private goods. Moreover, it should not be 
ignored that suspicion towards private interests 
— in particular commercial ones, and in 
particular concentrated economic power — is 
deeply rooted in European culture.17 Intimate 
relationships between scientists and commercial 
companies are simply bound to fuel concern, in 
society as a whole — and among scientists. 
In the early 1970s Jerome Ravetz — a 
scientist who made the switch from physics into 
studies of social problems of scientific know-
ledge — found that “the conditions of the in-
dustrialized science of the present” were 
eroding the maintenance of traditional scientific 
values18. Ravetz feared moral corruption and 
the degeneration of science, and he described a 
nightmarish vision of future science as 
“gigantic confidence-games, producing pseudo-
property at a feverish pace, and resembling a 
stock exchange in a bull market rather than a 
collective endeavour on behalf of the highest 
human goals”.19 
More recently, the case has been made that 
although — or exactly because — conditions 
are changing “[t]he ladder of the university’s 
value background has to be kept in place, not 
kicked away”.20 Today, the main task may be 
seen as one of adjusting traditional, academic 
and scientific values to new conditions. 
Scientists from a growing number of fields, and 
from the field of biotechnology in particular, 
are confronted with the task of bringing the 
mores of science into a situation where 
scientists not only “stand vis-á-vis a lay 
clientele in the same fashion as do the physician 
and the lawyer”,21 but where they are also — as 
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vi-a-vis a lay clintele. For that reason he deemed them to 
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 scientists — citizens among co-citizens. They 
are not only involved in business, being actors 
in the marketplace. They are also involved in 
politics; that is, they are — as scientists — 
members of the public, having a say on public 
affairs, and acting on matters of public interest. 
About how to organize the production of goods. 
About how to grow food. About  how to raise 
and care for animals. In this situation, an 
updating of the traditional values of openness 
and disinterestedness and of knowledge as a 
common good is of vital importance. 
 
In conclusion: science has re-entered society 
by embracing, and being embraced by, the 
marketplace. During this process an old 
schism has disclosed itself, a schism between 
different ideas of knowledge as a common 
good. Ideals of openness appear to a growing 
extent to be overruled by routines of confi-
dentiality, because such routines are seen as 
necessary to keep the scientific enterprise 
and the development of new technology 
going. Ideals of openness are, however, 
crucial to the relationship between the 
scientific community and the public at large.  
 
 
For further deliberation in the Network 
 
A key question for the Network is: how much 
priority should be given to the principle of 
openness, and on what grounds and under what 
conditions — and at what cost — should the 
principle of openness be overruled by the 
concern for confidentiality?  
Some related questions are likely to prove 
helpful to the deliberation: 
 
• Should the idea of knowledge as a common 
good imply that scientific knowledge 
should be publicly accessible? 
• Or should it be taken to mean that the 
production of scientific knowledge is so 
important to society — because scientific 
                                                                              
be less tempted to fraud and irresponsible claims. 
Merton; pp 613-614 
knowledge and technology are good in 
themselves or as means to improve eco-
nomic growth — that the purpose of 
keeping research going must overrule other 
concerns such as the concern that there 
should be openness about knowledge?  
• What should be considered public and 
private in the context of EADGENE?  
• What conflicts of interest may arise from 
the EADGENE research, and how may such 
conflicts be dealt with? 
 
11
 4  Parties unable to voice their concerns: animal welfare 
 
EADGENE specific 
 
In an early press release the Network was 
launched as a network on “animal health”. In 
internal, veterinary usage this may be seen as a 
proper description. The Network does concern 
itself with animal health as something that, if 
unattended to, may cause problems of produc-
tion, inefficiency and harm to consumers. 
Nevertheless, from the perspective of ordinary, 
everyday language, the reference to animal 
health may seem misleading. Health, be it in 
human beings or in (other) animals, may either 
be understood in a narrow sense as “absence of 
illness” or in a broad sense to connote a general 
state of well-being. A Network that is presented 
as a network on animal health may be expected 
by many to be aimed, primarily, at ensuring the 
well-being of animals. That is not the primary 
aim of EADGENE. But how, then, does the 
Network relate to those animals that are some 
of the most important objects of the research? 
 
A closer look at the documents does not pro-
vide very much of an answer. There are several 
references, not only to animal health, but also to 
animal welfare, but these are merely references, 
and they have not been elaborated. The 
pathogens to be investigated during the Net-
work cause very different levels of suffering in 
animals, but this is not mentioned and does not 
seem to be regarded as relevant. Improved 
conditions for the animals, in order to 
strengthen their immune defence, are men-
tioned among the lines of action that may be 
pursued, but the actual research efforts seem to 
be focused on exploring the possibilities for 
using precise, genetic knowledge in breeding in 
order to develop new selection strategies. 
The documents characterize the aims of 
breeding in terms of effectiveness and sus-
tainability, and a discussion opens on how to 
understand the notion of ‘sustainable breeding’. 
The notion of sustainability, it is observed on 
the EADGENE website, may be interpreted in a 
variety of ways and applied to a variety of 
fields. 
 
In general discussions, it is often noted that 
there are countless definitions of sustainability. 
It is true that attempts to define sustainability 
involve innumerable wordings, but many of 
these wordings are alternative ways of saying 
the same thing. Unfortunately, this mixture of 
conceptual and merely nomenclatural variation 
can be rather bewildering. Many papers on farm 
animal breeding and sustainability do not treat 
sustainability in a way that would provide 
breeders and other stakeholders in breeding and 
reproduction with practical guidance.  
Little has in fact been written directly on the 
subject. In the SEFABAR (Sustainable Euro-
pean Farm Animal Breeding and Reproduction) 
project – designed to identify sustainable prac-
tices in farm animal breeding and running for 
nearly three years from 2000 – commercial 
breeders and breeding scientists were required, 
with the assistance of bioethicists, economists, 
social scientists and NGO representatives, to 
develop a definition of sustainable farm animal 
breeding.22 However, the requirements of 
sustainable farm animal breeding still await 
clarification. Within the breeding and repro-
duction sector there is still a real need to define 
sustainability more clearly, and in more 
practical terms. 
The concept can be much more than a 
marketing ploy or an empty rallying cry of 
interest groups. If pursued sensibly, it may be 
developed into a powerful managerial device 
and a facilitator of communication that opens 
up discussions among stakeholders. However, 
certain distinctive features of sustainability 
need to be recognized. 
Firstly: it is a value-laden concept. Defini-
tions of sustainability will depend heavily on 
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 the values and priorities of the person, or group 
of people, doing the defining.  Consequently, 
when we try to spell out the practical detail, we 
find that there is no single, correct account of 
the requirements of sustainability. Conflicting 
concerns about animal welfare, productivity, 
food safety etc. cannot be by-passed. They will 
appear as elements of a discussion on 
sustainability. 
Secondly: sustainability as a framework for 
breeding animals as resources for future gen-
erations can hardly be stretched to cover 
concerns that are based on criticism of, 
precisely, the attitude towards animals as mere 
resources, mere means of production — rather 
than living beings in their own right. As regards 
ethics in relation to farm animals, sustainability 
is a necessary concept, but it is not sufficient to 
catch the ethical concerns. 
 
Regarding the issue of genetically modified 
animals, the project documents assure that there 
is no intention to genetically modify animals 
“for food production”23 The assurance may be 
taken to indicate an assumption that the 
public’s concerns relate, first and foremost, to 
fears for their own safety. Probably, this 
assumption represents a very unhelpful reduc-
tion of the public concerns that science and in-
dustry will have to deal with. Much more than 
concerns about risks and safety are at play. 
On the other hand, it would also be mis-
taken to overlook the existence of concerns that 
relate to scientific uncertainties. Scientists from 
the field of genomics are themselves eager to 
acknowledge the complexity of their research 
field and to emphasize that there are con-
siderable gaps in their knowledge of genes, 
their functions and how they are regulated. 
Indeed, the general fact that consequences of 
technological action cannot be foreseen in toto 
appears to be pronounced in the fields of gene 
technology and genomics. 
The idea of genomics delivering “perma-
nent” solutions in relation to animal disease 
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resistance24 and “improvements” that “add up 
generation after generation”25 is a powerful one, 
but is it also realistic ? How may this idea be 
linked to an acknowledgement that com-plexity 
and uncertainty are ever-present facts of life in 
genomics? How may overselling of the idea be 
avoided? How may the idea be prevented from 
spurring action that is too rash and over-
optimistic? And how may the idea be connected 
to concerns about sustainability and 
biodiversity, and to other ethical concerns about 
animal integrity? Moreover, to what extent is 
there consensus on questions like these among 
scientists from the field of genomics? And how 
may the questions be publicly discussed? 
 
In conclusion: there are several ideals at play 
in our dealing with nature and animals. One 
is that of wise use, allowing us to make good 
use of renewable resources of nature. An-
other is that of respecting individual animals 
in their own right. It is important to dis-
tinguish these two values from one another 
and to acknowledge that they may in some 
cases lead in opposite directions. This calls 
for reflection and the identification of a 
balance. 
 
 
Underlying themes:  
using animals, caring for animals 
 
The breeding of animals is as old as farming 
itself. Only in fairly recent times has it grown 
into a very controversial, public issue. Farm 
animal breeding involves the selection of the 
most suitable animals in order to produce future 
farm animals. The tremendous growth in, 
especially, the productivity of the farm animals 
has added to human wealth. It has also allowed 
farmers to make good use of the natural 
resources at their disposal. At the same time, 
however, farm animal breeding has had nega-
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 tive impacts — on animal health and welfare, 
and on genetic diversity. In relation to breeding 
programmes focusing on a single trait, typically 
a productivity-related trait, the point is fre-
quently made that other characteristics are 
likely to be neglected. This may have a negative 
impact on, for example, animal welfare and 
genetic diversity — an impact likely to give rise 
to concerns and complaints from within, as well 
as from without, the agricultural sector. 
Concern and criticism along those lines 
have been spurred by the development of 
modern biotechnology and, not least, by the 
actual demonstration that somatic cloning and 
the production of transgenic animals are techni-
cally possible. New technologies have been 
opposed. The argument, made by many scien-
tists, that these new technologies are in prin-
ciple not different from — just smarter than — 
earlier technologies of breeding, has opened the 
door to a whole host of more fundamental 
questions about animal breeding; questions, that 
is, that earlier went largely untouched and were 
not to the same extent regarded as matters for 
public discussion. It would, however, be mis-
taken to link this development in a simple way 
to the development of modern biotechnologies. 
In particular, it would be mistaken to explain it 
as a result merely of public fear of hitherto 
unknown technologies. 
 
It is widely assumed, not least among scientists 
from the field of biotechnology, that the public 
is scared of the mystical qualities of some 
entities called ‘genes’. This is seen as the rea-
son why people now oppose genetic modi-
fication in plants and animals and have even 
begun, in a seemingly irrational way, to ask 
questions about routines that, in principle, have 
been going on, largely unquestioned, for cen-
turies or even millennia. This line of reasoning 
depicts societal conflicts about the development 
of new agricultural technology as mere 
problems of explanation. There are, however, 
several flaws in the assumption upon which the 
reasoning has been based. Prominent among 
these are that it ignores public concerns about 
animal welfare and, more broadly, that it 
ignores concerns about the purpose of deve-
loping and using agricultural technology. 
As to the first point about concerns about 
animal welfare: in 1965, long before gene 
technology had become a reality and an issue 
for public discussion, the British writer Elspeth 
Huxley published an inquiry into modern food 
production. The publishers presented the topic 
of book as “a matter which concerns us all”, 
and part of the opening statement ran as 
follows: “People care […] deeply about the 
treatment of animals. Some believe that, by 
keeping them intensively, we are subjecting 
them to intolerable cruelties and abuses; others, 
that in believing this we are giving way to a 
sentimental emotionalism which will lead to 
more cruelty, not less, because animals, like 
humans, if properly looked after, will be better 
off indoors than out in all weathers, and 
because more humans will go hungry if we do 
not, by these and other methods, do our utmost 
to produce more food”.26 
These remarks were made in the days when 
the green revolution was taking place in the 
developing world, and when, in the industria-
lized countries, agriculture was marked by a 
wave of industrialization. Large steps were 
taken away from traditional husbandry towards 
modern livestock production. The public reac-
tion to this development was to a large extent 
interpreted as one of fear, not of genes, but of 
chemicals. However, as alluded to by Huxley, 
the reactions of the 1960s against new and 
efficient technologies in agriculture should not 
be seen simply as triggered by self-interested 
fear. Rather, ethical concerns about attitudes 
towards domestic animals and about care for 
domestic animals were crucial. 
This leads to the second point: The pur-
poses behind the use of new technologies were 
seen as disturbing. In more recent times social 
scientists have encountered and described 
similar concerns in relation to gene technology. 
In the decades since 1965 classical techniques 
of breeding have been used in a context of ever 
more industrialized agriculture. Efficient breed-
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 ing of production animals, aimed at making 
them grow fast and produce more meat, milk 
and eggs has resulted in cheaper food. As al-
ready mentioned, it has also resulted in health 
and welfare problems among animals. It seems 
reasonable to assume that current reactions to 
gene technology — understood to be a con-
tinuation of efforts to industrialize agriculture 
— have taken this experience into account. 
Moreover, it seems reasonable to assume that 
such reactions may be extended also to the use 
of applied genomics in breeding — at any rate, 
in so far as the purposes of breeding and the 
attitudes to the animals are not seen as clearly 
different from the purposes and attitudes of the 
agro-industrial rationality. 
At present, the idea that applied genomics 
might represent an ethically acceptable alterna-
tive to genetic modification is being tried out. It 
is tried out as a third way, so to speak, between 
genetic modification and classical breeding; but 
much closer related to the latter and free from 
the supposed hazards of the former. As these 
attempts to find an alternative way of making 
new genetic knowledge useful are being 
presently unfolded, they seem, however, to be 
connected, still, to an assumption that public 
opposition to genetic modification is based 
primarily on self-interested fear of the un-
known. As argued above, this assumption car-
ries the risk that we shall ignore ethical con-
cerns that relate to the care of animals (regarded 
as more than means of production) and to the 
purposes of new, agricultural technology. 
As scientists doing research on the use of 
genomics in breeding are, of course, well 
aware, genomics is not genetic modification. 
The techniques and the technical options are 
different from those of genetic modification. 
Committing themselves to stay within the field 
of applied genomics, scientists abstain from 
using certain technical options. Nevertheless, 
the aims of research funding agencies — and, in 
effect, the aims of the research that actually 
obtains funding — may be similar to those 
economic and commercial aims that genetic 
modification has been seen to be committed to. 
That might provoke opposition. In order to be 
able to discuss such criticism, and in order to 
further ethical reflection within the scientific 
community, the focus of internal discussions 
among scientists must shift from technical 
aspects and assumptions about a frightened 
public to the issue of purposes. 
 
 
For further deliberation in the Network 
 
Public opposition to new biotechnologies 
should not simply be explained as a fear of 
genes as mystical and incomprehensible enti-
ties. Much more down-to-earth worries matter; 
that is, worries about possible harm — that may 
be done inadvertently or because of hubris — to 
animals and to the environment. In any respon-
se to such concerns, questions of ‘why’ — and 
not only those of ‘how’ — must be seen to mat-
ter to scientists. 
Applied genomics helps to ensure that 
several parameters can be taken into account at 
the same time in order to make better selection 
strategies, but such techniques do not in them-
selves say anything about what the term of 
‘better’ should be taken to mean. In other 
words, the techniques cannot be used to decide 
which parameters should actually be taken into 
account, or how to prioritize conflicting aims. 
It has been stated as an aim of the 
EADGENE network that the EU should be 
enabled to maintain a leading position as 
regards defining the standards of farm animal 
breeding. It may be that an assumption, that 
Europe is committed to the highest ethical 
standards on the treatment of animals, underlies 
that specific goal. The ethical principles have, 
however, not been made explicit. Making them 
explicit is a task for the members of the Net-
work: why and how should the EU maintain a 
leading position in this field? To answer this 
question we also require answering the fol-
lowing questions: 
 
• In some situations concerns about ani-mal 
growth and concerns about animal welfare 
may be at odds: which concern, then, 
should overrule the other? 
15
 • What significance should be given to 
animal welfare in the research of the 
Network?  
• What should be done in order to ensure that 
breeding aimed at reducing the occurrence 
of certain pathogens in animals does not in 
other ways reduce animal welfare? 
16
 5  Conclusion: Network discussions as a first step 
 
This report has outlined some key ethical issues 
that must be confronted by the Network. 
Background information has been provided, 
and questions have been posed. Answers have 
not been delivered. That is so because the ques-
tions posed are meant for reflection and discus-
sion within the Network. The set of questions 
posed in relation to each of the three main 
issues should be regarded as means of identi-
fying those issues that should be taken into the 
public sphere for broader deliberation — and as 
tools for uncovering consensus as well as 
disagreement among members of the Network 
on the mores and means of the research. 
Thus, the questions should not be seen as 
questions on which the Network must find a 
consensus to present to the public at large. A 
group of scientists is not a political party and 
cannot be expected to present a united front. 
Being frank and sincere about substantial dis-
agreement may indeed be advantageous in 
involving other citizens in serious deliberation 
on challenges of huge complexity. 
It should be noted that there may be little to 
gain directly, here and now, from taking the 
trouble to engage with the above questions. 
Accordingly, there may be little to lose from 
ignoring them. The public sphere is crowded 
with groups of people — including groups of 
scientists — seeking attention. Most of these 
attempts go largely unnoticed. As a rule, they 
are neither rewarded nor punished. 
It is unlikely to cause a revolution if some 
scientists try to go public with another and 
more demanding agenda — trying to involve 
rather than to sell, being open about uncertain-
ties and disagreement, and aiming to engage 
broader groups of citizens in deliberation on the 
ethical and societal challenges set by scientific 
research and technology. In the long term, 
however, it may be detrimental to science to 
ignore the challenge. 
17
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